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Trade Unions and the Real Living Wage 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A notable development in industrial relations in recent years has been the growth of civil regulation: 
the formation of norms, standards and codes of practice by civil society organizations (CSOs) that 
they seek to have adopted by employers (Williams et al. 2011). An important question that is raised 
by this development concerns the relationship between civil regulation and more established 
methods of regulating employment through trade unionism and collective bargaining. One 
possibility is that civil regulation can hybridize with joint regulation, serving to reinforce the 
institutional position of trade unions and providing them with a resource better to represent their 
members. A reinforcing dynamic of this kind is suggested in the literature on union revitalization, by 
those who argue that unions can benefit from forming coalitions with CSOs that can provide unions 
with additional resources, campaigning expertise, enhanced legitimacy and the ability to contact 
previously unorganized workers (Tattersall 2010). Coalitions might also benefit CSOs, allowing them 
to draw upon union resources, such as bargaining relationships with employers and political 
influence, to help diffuse civil regulation. A particular benefit that unions might provide to CSOs is a 
presence at the workplace, allowing for the monitoring and full implementation of labour standards 
in a manner that compensates for the lack of an ongoing workplace presence of many campaigning 
organizations (Heery et al. 2014; see also Harvey et al. 2017). 
Alternatively, civil regulation may pose a threat to joint regulation, eroding the role of trade 
unions in representing workers and displacing collective bargaining.  A dynamic of this kind is 
suggested in the critical literature on voluntary codes of conduct applied by multinational companies 
to their supply chains, which it is claimed, supplant independent representation through trade 
unions in the countries where supplier firms operate (Esbenshade 2004). It is also suggested by the 
large body of literature on new social movements, which contains a frequent assertion that the 
identity-based movements that have emerged since the 1960s have progressively eroded the 
position of the ‘old’ movement of labour. Piore and Safford (2006), for example, argue that 
movements of this type have generated a fundamental change in the ‘regime of workplace 
governance’ that has largely replaced collective bargaining in the USA, though they emphasise the 
central part occupied by statutory employment rights in this regime rather than voluntary, civil 
regulation. 
A third arrangement is also possible, in which civil regulation and joint regulation remain 
distant from one another, with the former exerting little influence on the position of trade unions, 
whether for good or ill. This relationship of independence might arise, for instance, if civil regulation 
is confined to non-union employers, to non-union workers in unionized organisations or to 
employment issues with which trade unions typically do not engage (Heery et al. 2012). Where civil 
regulation and joint regulation occupy separate spheres in this way then they may be viewed as 
complementary, each compensating for the failings of the other. 
 This article explores these three different possibilities, using original research on the UK’s 
real Living Wage. The latter is a voluntary wage standard, derived from independent research into 
the expenditure needs of low-wage workers, which is promoted by the Living Wage Foundation 
(LWF) in conjunction with the Poverty Alliance, in Scotland, and Cynnal Cymru, in Wales. The 
standard comprises an hourly rate of pay that is meant to provide full-time workers with a modest 
but decent income: it is not a subsistence standard but rather includes provision for leisure 
expenditure and personal development. Separate rates are calculated for London and for the rest of 
the UK, both of which are higher than the confusingly titled National Living Wage, the statutory 
minimum rate of pay that applies to workers of 25 or over. In April 2018 the UK Living Wage stood at 
£8.75, the London Living Wage at £10.20 and the National Living Wage at £7.83. 
LWF is an offshoot of Citizens UK, the British arm of the international community organizing 
movement, and is part of an international campaign to promote the Living Wage, which originated in 
the USA and which has since spread to a number of other countries (Luce 2017). The central activity 
of LWF is the accreditation of employers that agree to pay the Living Wage. Once accredited, 
employers undertake to pay the Living Wage to all direct employees and to indirect workers 
employed by contractors who work permanently on the employer’s premises, such as catering, 
cleaning and security staff. Unlike the National Living Wage, the real Living Wage is paid to all 
workers aged 18 or more, except to those on apprenticeships and other training contracts. 
The Living Wage campaign in the UK was launched in 2001 in the East End of London and in 
2011 LWF was created and the process of accrediting employers began. Since then the scheme has 
met with considerable success. By November 2017, there were 3,752 accredited Living Wage 
Employers (LWEs) who directly employed 1.5M workers, 5 per cent of the UK employed workforce. It 
has been estimated that since the accreditation scheme was launched 135,000 workers have 
benefited directly from the Living Wage and that the total transfer of value to low-wage workers is in 
the region of £400M. The real Living Wage is a striking instance of civil regulation that has grown 
rapidly and which encompasses pay, the core subject-matter of trade union representation and 
collective bargaining. As such, it provides an ideal context in which to examine the relationship 
between civil regulation and trade unionism 
In examining this relationship in what follows we pursue three objectives. The first concerns 
the location of the Living Wage and the extent to which the standard coincides with trade unionism: 
is it concentrated in or absent from unionized organizations and parts of the economy where trade 
unions operate? The final scenario outlined above, that of the separateness of competing forms of 
regulation, suggests that the Living Wage will largely be absent from the unionised economy and we 
seek to test this claim. The second objective is to examine the response of trade unions to the Living 
Wage and the depth of their involvement in its adoption and implementation in those situations 
where trade unionism and the Living Wage overlap. Several indicators are of interest in this 
examination: the level of support of trade unions for the Living Wage and the extent to which they 
welcome it or regard it as a threat; the extent to which the trade unions have encouraged employers 
to adopt the Living Wage and shaped the operation of the standard post-implementation; and the 
degree to which the Living Wage has been absorbed within the collective process of joint regulation 
within accredited organizations so as to reinforce the union position. The final objective is to 
describe and account for the pattern of variation in union engagement with the Living Wage across 
the subset of LWEs where unions are present. The purpose here is to identify whether there are 
particular incentives or contexts that allow trade unions to engage positively with civil regulation. 
Our final aim, that is, is to identify those situations that approximate most closely to the situation of 
mutual reinforcement. 
2 RESEARCH METHODS 
A number of insightful case studies of Living Wage campaigns have been published in recent years, 
which focus on a single or a small number of organizations that have adopted the Living Wage, often 
as a result of trade union pressure (Johnson 2017; Lopes and Hall 2015; Prowse and Fells 2016a; 
2016b). The research reported below adopted a different, though complementary approach, the 
centrepiece of which was a population survey of all accredited Living Wage Employers carried out in 
late 2016. The purpose of the survey was to obtain representative data across the full range of 
experience of accredited employers, including their experience of trade union involvement in the 
introduction and implementation of the Living Wage. The survey was carried out with the 
cooperation of LWF and was completed by the Foundation’s named contact in accredited 
organizations. In smaller organizations these contacts tended to be managing owners, directors or 
executives, while in larger organizations they tended to be specialist managers, working in HR, 
communications, procurement or corporate responsibility. It is important to note that the 
respondents to the survey were not themselves trade union representatives and that its purpose, 
amongst others, was to obtain employer assessments of union involvement with the Living Wage. 
The survey was distributed in hard copy and through LWF’s email list to a total of 2851 accredited 
organizations, 845 of which (29.6 per cent) responded. Responses were broadly representative of 
the survey population in terms of size, sector and geographical location and the resultant dataset 
provides a strong foundation from which to generalize about union influence on the Living Wage. 
 In addition to the survey, the project made use of two other research methods. First, was a 
database of all Living Wage Employers accredited in the period up to February 2018. This database 
holds information on 4,294 employing organizations, 3,752 of which were currently accredited 
LWEs. For each case within the database information is held on geographical, sectoral and industry 
location, size measured by headcount and the number and characteristics of workers who have 
benefited directly from the Living Wage. A major purpose of the database is to show the distribution 
of Living Wage accreditation across the UK economy, including the extent to which it coincides with 
the distribution of trade unionism. Another important function of the database was to provide a 
series of structural variables to help with the analysis of the survey of accredited employers. 
 The final element of the project was a programme of interviews with trade union officers 
and representatives, representatives of employers’ organizations and senior managers from 
accredited LWEs. This programme included approximately 40 interviews, carried out between July 
2015 and May 2018, the majority of which were recorded and transcribed. The interview 
programme was deliberately broad in scope, seeking to gather information from a range of unions 
and from different types of employer. Trade unions included in the interview survey were drawn 
from the TUC (2 interviewees), UNISON (11), Unite (4), USDAW (3), GMB (2), PCS (2), UCATT (1), UCU 
(1) BECTU (3) and Nautilus (1). The purpose of these interviews was partly to provide a reliability 
check, to ascertain whether survey results matched the reported experiences of trade union 
representatives. It also served to provide qualitative insight into the process of accreditation and the 
union role, with interviewees providing examples and reflections upon their participation in the 
Living Wage campaign. 
 A final, noteworthy characteristic of the research that is reported below is that it is 
concerned solely with the role of unions within organizations that have been formally accredited as 
LWEs. Alongside these organizations, other employers have adopted the Living Wage often as a 
result of pressure from trade unions to do so. A number of the published case studies of the 
introduction of the Living Wage referenced above deal largely though not exclusively with non-
accredited organizations of this type (e.g. Johnson 2017; Prowse and Fells 2016a). Our reasons for 
focusing on accredited organizations are partly pragmatic: the database and survey of employers 
have been assembled with the cooperation of LWF, the accrediting body for the Living Wage. But 
they also incorporate the principle of theoretical sampling. The purpose of the research is to use the 
Living Wage as a basis for examining the relationship between civil regulation and trade unionism. It 
is in accredited organizations, where the employer has formed a contractual relationship with LWF 
and agreed to implement its standard that civil regulation most clearly applies. It is therefore 
appropriate to focus our inquiry on those employers that have been formally accredited. 
3 THE LIVING WAGE AND TRADE UNION PRESENCE 
The third scenario outlined above, in which civil regulation and union-based regulation remain 
separate of one another, is most likely to arise if the Living Wage is confined to the non-union 
economy. One way of establishing if this is the case is to examine if accredited LWEs tend to be 
located in parts of the economy from which unions are largely absent. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of LWEs by a measure of union presence, with the latter comprising an average of the 
percentage of union membership in the region, sector and industry in which the employer is based. 
It indicates very clearly that most LWEs are found in parts of the economy where the union presence 
is low. This pattern reflects the fact that 40 per cent of LWEs are concentrated in London and the 
South East, only a small percentage (7 per cent) are found within the heavily unionised public sector, 
and a majority (62 per cent) are found in industries like finance, ICT and professional services, with a 
union density of less than 15 per cent. It can also be noted that most LWEs (70 per cent) are micro or 
small employers with fewer than 50 employees; another employer characteristic that is associated 
with the absence of trade unionism.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 The evidence in the employer database, therefore, provides prima facie evidence for 
separation; that civil regulation in the form of the Living Wage is applied in parts of the economy 
where unions are largely absent. This conclusion must be qualified, however, and Figure 1 also 
shows that a proportion of LWEs are found in parts of the economy where unions are relatively well-
established. About a fifth of LWEs are found in parts of the economy where union density is higher 
than the national average (25 per cent) and about five per cent are found where union density is 40 
per cent or more. Moreover, because these LWEs tend to be large, the percentages of workers 
covered by the Living Wage and benefiting directly from it are substantial: 44 per cent of workers 
covered and 47 per cent of recipients of pay increases are found in parts of the economy where 
union density is higher than the national average. These data indicate not only that the Living Wage 
is compatible with a union presence but that it has been disproportionately impactful where unions 
are present, suggesting that unions may play an important role in diffusing civil regulation. 
 The pattern of findings from the survey of LWEs was broadly similar. Managers completing 
the survey were asked, “Does your organisation recognise or deal with a trade union (or trade 
unions) that represent your employees”, to which only 18 per cent answered in the affirmative. Not 
only are most LWEs found in parts of the economy from which unions are largely absent, therefore, 
most are non-union employers. It remains though that the Living Wage has spread to unionised 
organizations and the survey, like the dataset, points to the prima facie compatibility of civil and 
union-based forms of regulation. Indeed, if one considers the number of workers employed by 
accredited employers and the number receiving a pay increase because of accreditation the 
compatibility is even more apparent. Just over three quarters of both covered employees and 
employees directly benefiting from the Living Wage worked for unionised organizations. 
 The employer dataset and the employer survey have furnished broadly compatible findings. 
They indicate that while the Living Wage is found largely where unions are absent it is also found 
within unionised organizations and in parts of the economy where unions remain strong. Moreover, 
because LWEs in the unionised part of the economy tend to be large, public service organizations the 
impact of the Living Wage, measured by the percentage of workers receiving a pay increase, is 
disproportionately high where unions are present. On this evidence, it seems there is no necessary 
relationship between non-unionism and civil regulation. The two forms can exist independently of 
one another but can also coincide. Given this coincidence, it is important to establish the response of 
unions to the Living Wage and the effect they have had on its diffusion and implementation. 
 
4. TRADE UNION SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN LIVING WAGE ACCREDITATION 
The first and second scenarios outline above suggest respectively that civil regulation can reinforce 
or serve to erode union-based industrial relations. The first scenario suggests also that CSOs 
promoting civil regulation will gain from union involvement in diffusing voluntary standards; that 
there will be mutual reinforcement between the two forms of regulation. If the first scenario applies 
in the case of the Living Wage, then one would expect trade unions to welcome and be supportive of 
accreditation, to play an important part in encouraging employers to accept the standard, and for 
the Living Wage to be absorbed within the procedures of joint regulation, becoming subject to joint 
consultation and collective bargaining in organizations where it is adopted. One would also expect 
unions to be involved in ongoing scrutiny of the Living Wage in organizations where they are 
present. The reverse of these expectations will be borne out if the second scenario applies. In this 
case, unions will perceive the Living Wage as a threat and will not support accreditation. In addition, 
they will not campaign for the Living Wage or play a significant part in its adoption, the Living Wage 
will be excluded from the process of joint regulation and there will be an absence of active union 
scrutiny post-implementation. Moreover, if the Living Wage is being used to replace unions then one 
would expect its introduction to be characterised by the involvement of non-union actors and the 
promotion of other forms of employee voice. 
4.1 Trade union support for the Living Wage 
Table 1 shows that in most cases the union response to the Living Wage has been positive and that 
the union has backed accreditation. This response within LWEs was echoed in several of the 
interviews with union representatives. These affirmed formal union support for the Living Wage and 
the Living Wage campaign and suggested a dual rationale for that support. One element of this 
rationale was instrumental: the Living Wage provided unions with an opportunity to secure wage 
increases from employers that was particularly attractive in the context of austerity and reduced 
union bargaining power. Faced with, “pay freezes or one per cent pay caps”, a UNISON officer 
remarked, the Living Wage had allowed the union to secure, “some wins…when there is little 
appetite for industrial action among members”. In addition to the instrumental appeal of the Living 
Wage, however, union officers also stressed the normative appeal of the standard. Another UNISON 
officer placed the Living Wage in a long tradition of fighting for the lower paid that stretched back to 
the first calls for a statutory minimum wage in the 1970s: “It’s always been a campaigning theme of 
UNISON”. This support, moreover, encompassed unions with a largely professional membership, 
such as UCU and FDA, which had lent their support to Living Wage campaigns despite the fact that 
their members did not stand to gain financially. Unions supported the Living Wage because there 
was an elective affinity between the standard and the ‘solidaristic’ wages policies that many unions 
pursue, with their twin themes of bottom-loading wage settlements to the benefit of the lower paid 
and using the bargaining power of core workers to secure gains for those who are less well-
organized (Heery 2009). 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 While the union was reported to have supported the Living Wage in most accredited 
organizations this was not always the case and in about a quarter of LWEs, managers said that the 
union had not been supportive. In some organizations this may have been because union 
representatives actively rejected the Living Wage. The interviews again suggested this might be the 
case, with a number of respondents expressing scepticism about both the standard and the Living 
Wage campaign. For example, it was pointed out that while the Living Wage increased the hourly 
rate, it did not guarantee an adequate weekly income because many low-paid workers experienced 
short and unpredictable working hours. It was also suggested that Living Wage accreditation could 
confer legitimacy on otherwise bad employers and that the campaign was driven as much by the 
institutional needs of Citizens UK and LWF as by the needs of low-wage workers: one interviewee 
said that the campaign was focused on collecting “scalps”, signing employers up for accreditation 
regardless of the benefit to workers.  
However, while perceptions of this kind might explain the failure of the union to support the 
Living Wage in accredited organizations, it cannot be assumed that this is the case. An absence of 
support for the Living Wage might derive from scepticism or direct opposition but it could equally 
arise from the union failing to adopt a position or of the employer remaining ignorant of that 
position. In those organizations where a lack of union support was reported this could be due to 
union apathy, to union ineffectualness or simply to a failure of communication. 
4.2 Trade union involvement in the introduction and implementation of the Living Wage 
That apathy is a likely cause is suggested by the second line in Table 1, which indicates that in only a 
fifth of LWEs had the union campaigned for the Living Wage to be introduced. These responses are 
from managers who may be inclined to under-report union campaigning but the pattern is 
nevertheless striking and suggests that in many cases union support for the Living Wage has not 
been sufficient to generate pressure for its introduction. The reinforcement supplied to the Living 
Wage campaign from trade unions, on this evidence, appears decidedly modest. 
 The next three rows suggest that the reinforcing effect of the Living Wage for trade 
unionism has also been modest. In just under half of LWEs, the union was reported to have played 
no role in the introduction of the Living Wage and when union representatives were involved this 
primarily took the form of consultation, defined in terms of union views being asked for. In only 
about a tenth of cases where a union was present was the Living Wage the subject of collective 
bargaining, such that an agreement covering the standard was negotiated. This evidence accords 
with the wider interpretation of joint regulation, which emphasises the hollowing out of workplace 
trade unionism and the displacement of collective bargaining with joint consultation (Brown and 
Nash 2008). The introduction of the Living Wage, according to the survey evidence, is congruent with 
this broad trend though it does not suggest that the spread of the standard is itself a significant 
causal influence. 
 The final rows in Table 1 present evidence on union attempts to shape the Living Wage after 
the initial accreditation decision had been taken. It was suggested above that unions might play an 
important role in this regard, providing scrutiny of management behaviour and ensuring that the 
standard is fully and correctly applied. They might also play a role in building upon the standard, 
extending it to workers who fall outside the formal requirements of accreditation, such as short-
term agency workers, or seeking compensating pay increases for higher graded workers who have 
experienced a reduction of their pay relativity. Some of the case study research reports unions 
acting in this manner (Prowse and Fells 2016a). 
 The survey findings indicate that in a small number of LWEs the union has sought to build on 
Living Wage accreditation and secure further concessions from management. Employers report that 
recognised unions have tried to extend the Living Wage to other groups of employees, have tried to 
secure pay increases above the Living Wage, and have tried to restore differentials for higher graded 
workers. In all cases, however, action of this kind was reported by less than 10 per cent of unionised 
employers, indicating that post-implementation pressure from trade unions has been a marginal 
feature of the Living Wage across accredited organizations. The table, moreover, suggests that one 
reason for the lack of post-implementation activity is that unions have been broadly satisfied with 
the way in which the Living Wage has been introduced: only 5 per cent of employers with trade 
unions reported that the union was ‘critical of the way in which the Living Wage was implemented’. 
The evidence on implementation, just like that for introduction, suggests that union involvement has 
been limited but that the union has been broadly accepting of the Living Wage. 
4.4 The relative influence of trade unions over the adoption of the Living Wage 
Another way in which union influence over the introduction of the Living Wage can be assessed is by 
comparing it with that of other actors both within the workplace and beyond. The employer survey 
asked respondents to rate the influence of a range of internal and external groups on the decision to 
become an accredited LWE on a four point scale, which ranged from ‘no influence’, through ‘little’ 
and ‘moderate influence’ to a ‘great deal of influence’. Included in the lists of potential influencers 
were ‘trade union members or representatives’ within the organization and external trade unions; 
alongside owners, different categories of managers, peer organizations, suppliers, customers and 
clients, politicians, non-union representatives, Living Wage campaigners and workers who were 
themselves likely to benefit financially from Living Wage accreditation. The results of this exercise 
are shown in Table 2, which presents the mean scores for influence for all of the groups that 
respondents were asked to rate. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 Several findings are apparent in the table, which relate to the question of the relationship 
between trade unionism and civil regulation. First, the table indicates that senior managers and 
owners have been the primary force behind the introduction of the Living Wage even where trade 
unions are present; a finding that echoes those of case studies of the introduction of the Living Wage 
(Johnson 2017; Lopes and Hall 2015). Moreover, in LWEs with trade unions specialist managers in HR 
and CSR are also likely to have played an active part in the adoption of the standard, reflecting the 
fact that both sets of actors tend to be found in larger organizations with more formal, differentiated 
structures of management. Second, within unionised LWEs union members and representatives are 
rated as the most significant internal influence on Living Wage adoption after senior and specialist 
managers, owners and directors. This pattern of relatively high union influence is also seen in the 
estimates for external actors, where trade unions are ranked third highest after LWF and Living 
Wage campaigners, such as Citizens UK, in LWEs where they are present. To a degree, this relatively 
strong showing on the part of trade unions is surprising. Much of the literature on civil regulation 
emphasises the part played in its diffusion by community mobilization, pressure from customers, the 
role of business networks and the use of supply chains (e.g. Reinecke and Donaghey 2015). For the 
Living Wage, the traditional labour market actor, trade unions, emerges as more influential in 
spreading civil regulation than do any of these ‘new actors’, with the exception of those 
organizations dedicated specifically to the spread of the Living Wage. 
 Third, while LWF and its Scottish equivalent and Living Wage campaigners, such as Citizens 
UK and the Poverty Alliance, emerge as more influential than trade unions in the decision to adopt 
the Living Wage, there is no evidence that they are acquiring this influence at the expense of unions. 
In fact, Living Wage campaigners are reported to have more influence where unions are present, not 
less as one would expect if there was competition between the two, and employers tend to rate 
unions as exerting relatively strong influence where they also give LWF and Citizens a high rating. 
Fourth, there is no evidence in the table that other forms of worker voice are displacing unions. Non-
union representatives, workers seeking to be paid the Living Wage and higher paid workers and the 
direct managers of the lower paid are all identified in the table as being relatively uninfluential in 
both unionised and non-union LWEs, reinforcing the perception of accreditation as a largely top-
down decision. It is also notable, however, that expression of direct worker voice is higher in 
unionised organizations and there is no evidence from the table that adoption of the Living Wage 
has been coupled to reliance on forms of non-union worker participation. 
 The evidence in Table 2 partially confirms and partially stands as a corrective to that in Table 
1. It confirms the earlier finding that unions have often not been heavily involved in the introduction 
of the Living Wage: in only 23 per cent of unionised LWEs was it reported that the internal union had 
exerted a ‘great deal of influence’ and in only 13 per cent was it said that the external union had 
done so. Table 2, moreover, places this picture of modest union influence in context by showing that 
in most cases the introduction of the Living Wage has been a top-down decision, primarily involving 
senior managers and owners and their public sector equivalents. There is evidence in both tables of 
at best modest reinforcement of the union position through civil regulation. But neither is there 
evidence in Table 2 of civil regulation displacing the union role. Unions have shaped the 
accreditation decision alongside Living Wage campaigners and there is little evidence of direct 
worker voice or the voices of other stakeholders, such as customers or other service users, 
supplanting unions in calling for good labour standards. Rather, these other voices, though generally 
weak, seem to be articulated most clearly where unions are present. 
5. VARIATION IN UNION SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE 
Both Table 1 and Table 2 indicate that there is considerable variation in the level of union influence 
over the Living Wage and we turn now to examining this variation, seeking to identify those 
situations where the union has been influential and those where it has largely been excluded from 
influence. One method of examination is to look at the interrelationship between the items 
presented in the tables and to assess whether union influence over the Living Wage is related to 
union support for and campaigning on behalf of the standard. It may be that the capacity of unions 
to help diffuse the Living Wage and to benefit from its diffusion is partly a matter of union choice, 
with higher levels of influence flowing from higher levels of engagement. 
 Table 3 presents employer estimates of union influence over the decision to adopt the Living 
Wage and involvement in the process of introduction broken down by whether the union supported 
and campaigned for the Living Wage. Each row contains column percentages taken from a series of 
cross-tabulations. The first cells in the table, therefore, indicate that in 68 per cent of cases where 
the union was supportive of the Living Wage it was also involved in implementation, compared with 
only 23 per cent of cases where the union was not supportive. All of the cross-tabulations were 
statistically significant, most at the .001 level. 
The evidence in Table 3 shows unambiguously that supportive and campaigning unions were 
more likely to exert a ‘great deal of influence’ over the decision to adopt and were more likely to be 
involved in the introduction of the Living Wage, to be consulted and to have engaged in 
negotiations. Where the union was not perceived to be supportive or to have campaigned, the 
reverse tended to be the case. It is particularly striking that where the union had not campaigned for 
the Living Wage, employers in virtually all cases reported that both the internal and external union 
had exercised ‘no influence’ over the decision to adopt the standard. A reasonable inference from 
the table is that in some cases unions have excluded themselves from influence over the Living 
Wage, while in others their engagement with the issue has allowed them to acquire influence.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 The next stage in the analysis was to identify the situations in which unions have influenced 
the Living Wage in the manner suggested by the argument of mutual reinforcement. One possibility 
is that unions are more likely to become involved in the introduction of the Living Wage where they 
have an incentive to do so; that is where the Living Wage will deliver tangible increases in pay for 
union members. It can be hypothesized therefore that the union will be more likely to support, to 
campaign for, be involved in and to influence the Living Wage where the latter leads to pay increases 
for a greater number of employees, a greater percentage of employees and for those who are 
directly employed who are more likely to be union members. Another possibility is that the context 
in which the Living Wage is introduced might be supportive of union influence. Unions might be 
more likely to become involved in the introduction of the Living Wage and to be influential within 
larger employing organizations, where prevailing wage rates are relatively high (thereby making the 
Living Wage more readily attainable), in parts of the economy where unions are strongly established 
and in the public sector, the main bastion of union strength. 
 To test the arguments a scale measure of union involvement in and influence over the 
introduction of the Living Wage was calculated, which added together the estimates of internal and 
external union influence and employer reports of whether the union had been involved in the 
introduction of the Living Wage, had been consulted or had engaged in negotiations. This scale was 
statistically reliable (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.8), with values ranging from zero to nine. The mean 
‘influence score’ across the 145 organizations for which data were available was 3.5, with 21 (14.5 
per cent) organizations reporting a score of seven or above and 58 (40 per cent) recording a score of 
2 or below, a distribution that reinforces the point made earlier about the generally low level of 
union influence over the introduction of the Living Wage. 
Table 4 presents the results of OLS regression analysis where the dependent variable is the 
composite union influence measure described above.   A stepwise method was employed with the 
dependent variables relating to trade union context entered first.  The variables used are a dummy 
for the public sector, organizational size measured by the number of direct employees, a measure of 
the extent of low pay in the area in which the LWE is based (the percentage of workers paid below 
the Living Wage in the local authority area), and the combined measure of union density presented 
in Figure 1. The variables relating to the 'union incentive' to push for Living Wage accreditation are 
entered into the model in step 2 and include indicators that measure the impact of the Living Wage; 
the absolute number of employees who received a wage increase following accreditation and the 
proportion of these employees as a percentage of the total direct workforce.  There are also two 
variables that measure the likelihood that beneficiaries will be unionised; the percentage of 
recipients that are full-time and the percentage that are directly employed. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The results in table 4 show that the model is significant and explains just over a quarter of 
the variation in the union influence variable.   The results also confirm the argument outlined above: 
union influence over the introduction of the Living Wage has been stronger in parts of the economy 
where the institutional position of trade unionism is itself relatively strong, with the measure of 
organizational size and the public sector proving to be particularly significant. The pattern of 
evidence here suggests that where unions are relatively well-established they have been better able 
to shape civil regulation. It should also be noted that UNISON and the GMB, two of the major public 
sector unions, have been strong supporters of the Living Wage and that the association of union 
influence with the public sector may partly reflect supportive union policy (Johnson 2017; Prowse 
and Fells 2016a). 
The results only provide weak support for the belief that unions have influenced the Living 
Wage in situations where there is an incentive for them to become engaged. The addition of the 
‘incentive’ variables to the model only increases the R-square figure by three percent.  Only one of 
these variables is statistically significant, with the results indicating that union influence and 
involvement is positively related to the proportion of the total workforce that has been affected by 
the Living Wage and received a pay increase. Union influence is not found to be related to whether 
these beneficiaries are direct or full-time employees, who are more likely to be union members and 
to fall within the span of collective bargaining. The pattern of results as a whole suggests that union 
influence on the Living Wage is less a function of instrumental motivations and more likely to be 
determined by the context within which accreditation take place. 
6. CONCLUSION 
What is striking about the evidence presented above is that it does not conform closely to any of the 
three scenarios that can be derived from the literature on trade unionism and civil regulation: 
reinforcement, replacement and independence. With regard to the latter, the evidence on the 
distribution of the Living Wage indicates that, while there is no elective affinity with trade unionism 
neither is there incompatibility: civil regulation and trade unionism can flourish in the same place 
but equally they can grow separately from one another. Civil regulation and regulation through 
collective bargaining, on this evidence, can coincide but this coincidence is not a precondition for 
voluntary standards like the Living Wage to become established. 
 With regard to reinforcement and replacement, it is notable that the evidence sits between 
these two scenarios, confirming elements of both while also providing contradiction. Reinforcement 
finds support in the generally positive response of trade union representatives to the Living Wage 
and the relative absence of conflict surrounding its introduction but is not supported by the 
evidence of generally limited union involvement in the implementation of the Living Wage. Unions 
have acquired more influence over the standard where the context is favourable, where there is 
greater incentive for them to do so and seemingly where they have been more strongly supportive 
of the Living Wage from the outset. Nevertheless, the primary pattern is one of limited influence and 
the Living Wage has been absorbed within collective bargaining in only a small minority of cases. 
 A similarly mixed pattern of findings is apparent with regard to the replacement scenario. 
Unions have not been deeply involved in negotiating the Living Wage and have typically not sought 
to shape its operation post-adoption. The Living Wage has been introduced in a top-down manner in 
most organizations, alongside not through the vehicle of established union-management relations. 
However, there is minimal evidence that the Living Wage has been implemented as part of a 
deliberate strategy of union replacement and the adoption of the standard has not involved the 
cultivation of non-union forms of worker-voice within adopting organizations. Although only 
involved to a limited degree, unions seemingly have enjoyed more influence over the introduction of 
the Living Wage than most other potential groups of influencers either internal or external to 
accredited employers.  
 How might one interpret this mixed pattern of findings? One way of doing so is to reflect on 
the nature of the Living Wage campaign. In the academic literature the latter is often characterised 
as a social movement, one of a series of ‘economic justice movements’ that have emerged in recent 
years to contest austerity and high levels of labour market inequality (Bernhardt and Osterman 
2017). For writers who prescribe the recreation of trade unionism as a social movement there is an 
affinity between movements of this kind and progressive currents within the labour movement that 
can provide the basis for joint-work and union-community coalitions (Taipa 2014). However, while 
the Living Wage campaign does possess social movement characteristics it is not defined fully in 
these terms and in many respects it resembles corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, such 
as those promoting fair trade, sustainable use of the environment and respect for human rights. 
Thus, Bunyan’s (2016) review of the campaign notes that the LWF has largely eschewed ‘agitational’ 
methods and has promoted the Living Wage to employers in terms of the ‘business case’; that 
paying higher wages will deliver positive, tangible benefits to accredited employers. The fee-based 
system of accrediting LWEs that is operated by LWF exemplifies this CSR orientation and is a method 
shared with other bodies promoting standards of good management practice to employers. 
 If the Living Wage is viewed in these terms as a CSR initiative, then the mixed pattern of 
findings presented above can be seen to follow a common pattern. In Gold et al.’s (2015) account of 
union reactions to CSR programmes in the UK, the dominant response is one of support and 
acceptance – with an admixture of scepticism – but with limited direct involvement or attempts to 
secure such involvement. This is precisely the dominant pattern seen in the response of trade unions 
to the Living Wage in accredited LWEs. In this journal, Harvey et al. (2017) have argued that CSR 
provides an opportunity for unions, enabling them to shape management policy and extend their 
influence to a new agenda. The evidence presented in this article indicates that few unions are 
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Note: The combined measure is the average union density for the UK nation or region, sector 
and industry in which each accredited Living Wage Employer is based. The data are for 







Table 1 Involvement of trade unions in the introduction and implementation of the 
Living Wage 
 
 Per cent 
The trade union(s) was fully supportive of the decision to introduce the 
Living Wage 
73 
The trade union(s) campaigned for the Living Wage to be introduced in 
your organization 
19 
The trade union(s) had no involvement in the introduction of the Living 
Wage 
45 
The trade union was consulted about the introduction of the Living 
Wage; i.e. union views were asked for 
48 
The introduction of the Living Wage was negotiated with the trade 
union(s); i.e. there is a collective agreement that covers the Living Wage 
13 
The trade union(s) was critical of the way in which the Living Wage was 
implemented 
5 
Post-implementation, the trade union(s) has tried to have the Living 
Wage extended to other workers 
7 
Post-implementation, the trade union has tried to secure a wage rate 
above the Living Wage 
9 
Post-implementation, the trade union has tried to restore differentials for 
employees who are paid more than the Living Wage 
5 
Source: Survey of Living Wage Employers, 2016; N = 145 – 149; LWEs recognising trade unions 
  
Table 2 Relative influence of trade unions over the introduction of the Living Wage 
 
Internal influences Union Non-
union 
External influence Union Non-
union 
Senior managers or executives 3.47 3.14 LWF or Scottish Living Wage 
Accreditation Initiative 
2.68 2.39 
HR managers 2.77 2.17 Living Wage campaigners, 
including CUK and Poverty 
Alliance 
2.48 2.27 
Owner of the organization 2.50 2.98 Trade unions 2.05 1.14 
Non-executive directors or 
trustees 
2.28 1.94 Politicians or political parties 1.95 1.34 
Trade union members or 
representatives 
2.25 1.12 Peer organizations; e.g. an 
organization similar to your 
own, including competitors 
1.80 1.59 
CSR managers 2.14 1.71 Research or media 
organizations which have 
publicised issue of LW 
1.72 1.77 
Staff members who would not 
themselves benefit from LW 
1.82 1.61 Customers or clients of the 
organization 
1.71 1.66 
Investors and/or shareholders 1.82 1.73 Public bodies to which you 
contract to provide a service 
1.61 1.56 
Communications or PR 
managers 
1.79 1.58 A membership association for 
organizations of your type 
1.58 1.24 
Direct managers of those likely 
to receive LW 
1.70 1.59 Community leaders or 
organizations 
1.54 1.31 
Purchasing managers 1.69 1.41 An organization that provides 
you with funding 
1.53 1.37 
Organization members who use 
the service provided; e.g. 
students, congregations 
1.63 1.27 Subcontractors who provide a 
service to your organization 
1.36 1.22 
Staff members seeking to be 
paid LW 





1.51 1.20 Private businesses to which 
you contract to provide a 
service 
1.32 1.39 
Source: Survey of Living Wage Employers, 2016; N = 148-152 LWEs recognising unions; N = 653-669 non-
union LWEs. Mean scores derived from employer responses on a 4-point scale; 1 ‘No influence’, 2 ‘Little 
influence’, 3 ‘Moderate influence’, 4 ‘A great deal of influence’ 
 
  
Table 3 Union support and union campaigning for the Living Wage by union influence 
 
 Union support for LW 
Column % 
Union campaigning for LW 
Column % 
 
 Yes No 
 
Yes No 
Union involvement in the introduction 
of the Living Wage 
68 23 89 47 
Union consultation about the 
introduction of the Living Wage 
61 13 75 41 
Negotiation of the Living Wage with 
union(s) 
18 0 29 9 
Great deal of influence on the decision 
to pay the Living Wage, internal union 
30 5 50 16 
No influence on the decision to pay the 
Living Wage, internal union 
25 80 0 54 
Great deal of influence on the decision 
to pay the Living Wage, external union 
17 0 29 8 
No influence on the decision to pay the 
Living Wage, external union 
27 80 7 51 
Source: Survey of Living Wage Employers, 2016; N = 144-149; all associations measured by chi square are 
statistically significant at the .001 level with the exception of those relating to union negotiation of the Living 






























Table 4 Linear model of predictors of union influence on Living Wage accreditation 
 
 b SE B b p 
Step 1     
   Constant  3.24 
(1.46, 5.19) 
.90  .001 
   Public Sector 1.18  
(-0.48, 2.99) 
.89 .19 .190 
   Organization size .00  
(.00, .00) 
.00 .27 .001 
   Low pay area -.012  
(-0.06, 0.03) 
.02 -.03 .590 
   Combined measure of union density .054  
(-0.02, 0.11) 
.04 .23 .148 
Step 2     
   Constant  3.82 
(1.93, 5.90) 
.99  .001 
   Public Sector 1.81 
(0.21,3.63) 
.82 .29 .035 
   Organization size .00  
(.00, .00) 
.00 .26 .003 
   Low pay area -.01  
(-0.05 ,0.04) 
.02 -.03 .620 
   Combined measure of union density .03  
(-0.04, 0.08) 
.03 .11 .422 
   Total number receiving Living Wage .00 
 (.00, .00) 
.00 .04 .440 
   % of employees receiving Living Wage .05  
(-0.40, 0.13) 
.20 .18 .006 
   FT recipients as % of total recipients -.174  
(-1.01, 0.59) 
.415 -.027 .679 
   Direct recipients as % of total recipients -.073  
(-0.90, 0.79) 
.408 -.012 .854 
Notes: R2 = .24 for step 1; DR2 = .03 (all significant at .000). 
95% bias corrected, and accelerated confidence intervals reported in parentheses. Confidence 
intervals and standard errors based on 1000 bootstrap samples. 
 
 
